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INTRODUCTION & CULTURAL CONTEXT
On May 25, 2020, a teenage employee of a Minneapolis food store called
911 alleging that George Floyd had attempted to purchase cigarettes with
what appeared to be a fake twenty dollar bill.1 Police found Floyd around the
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corner from the store, unarmed and sitting with friends in his car.2 An officer
approached, pulled out his gun, and ordered Floyd to show his hands.3 Floyd
was initially uncooperative, but after the officer explained that Floyd was
being arrested for “passing counterfeit currency,” Floyd complied with the
officers’ requests.4 Court transcripts of recordings from police body cameras
showed Floyd was “co-operative at the beginning of the arrest, repeatedly
apologizing to the officers after they approach[ed] his parked car.”5
A white police officer, Derek Chauvin, then arrived on the scene. 6 He
attempted to pull Floyd from his car and place him in a police car; in the
process, Floyd fell to the ground and “lay there, face down, still in
handcuffs.”7 As other officers restrained Floyd, for nine minutes and twenty
nine seconds, Chauvin kept his knee on Floyd’s neck.8 During that period
Floyd said more than twenty times that he could not breathe.9 His last words

1

George Floyd: What Happened in the Final Moments of His Life, BBC NEWS (July 16,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52861726; What We Know About the
Death of George Floyd in Minneapolis, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd.html; Elliott C. McLaughlin, Three Videos
Piece Together the Final Moments of George Floyd’s Life, CNN.COM (updated June 23,
2020,
9:14
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/01/us/george-floyd-three-videosminneapolis/index.html.
2

George Floyd: What Happened, supra note 1; What We Know, supra note 1; McLaughlin,
supra note 1.
3

George Floyd: What Happened, supra note 1; McLaughlin, supra note 1.

4

George Floyd: What Happened, supra note 1; What We Know, supra note 1.

5

George Floyd: What Happened, supra note 1.

6

Id.; McLaughlin, supra note 1.

7

George Floyd: What Happened, supra note 1. The probable cause statement prepared by
police describes Floyd “stiffen[ing] up, [falling] to the ground and [telling] the officers he
was claustrophobic.” McLaughlin, supra note 1. “[H]e went to the ground face down and
still handcuffed,” the statement continues. Id.
8

George Floyd: What Happened, supra note 1; Eric Levenson, Former Officer Knelt on
George Floyd for 9 Minutes and 29 Seconds - Not the Infamous 8:46, CNN.COM (Mar. 30,
2021,
6:27
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/29/us/george-floyd-timing-929846/index.html.
9

George Floyd: What Happened, supra note 1. Cf. also McLaughlin, supra note 1 (“Floyd
also says, ‘I’m through,’ and repeatedly cries out in anguish, the video shows. . . . He tells
the witnesses, ‘They’re going to kill me, man,’ and then to the officers, ‘Don’t kill me.’ . . .
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were a chilling recognition of his fate: “Can’t believe this, man. Mom, love
you. Love you. Tell my kids I love them. I’m dead.”10
Officer Chauvin kept his knee on Floyd’s neck for at least another
minute, although another officer could not detect a pulse.11 When Chauvin
did get up, Floyd’s motionless body “was rolled on to a gurney” and taken to
the Hennepin County Medical Center in an ambulance.12 He was pronounced
dead about an hour later.13 A video of the incident went viral, stirring a
nationwide reckoning with twenty-first century racial injustice and the
extrajudicial police killings of Black Americans.14
That reckoning involved widespread protests. In the days and weeks
following Floyd’s death, Americans in more than 1,700 cities flooded the
streets to challenge police brutality against Black people in the United
States.15 In some cities with sizable, lasting protests, then-President Donald
Trump responded by sending federal troops.16 Although nominally meant to
[W]hen [another officer] asked if they should roll Floyd on his side, Chauvin said he was
staying put.”).
10

George Floyd: What Happened, supra note 1.

11

Id.; McLaughlin, supra note 1.

12

George Floyd: What Happened, supra note 1.

13

Id.; see also Lorenzo Reyes, Trevor Hughes & Mark Emmert, Medical Examiner and
Family-Commissioned Autopsy Agree: George Floyd’s Death Was a Homicide, USA TODAY
(updated
June
1,
2020,
8:46
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/06/01/george-floyd-independentautopsy-findings-released-monday/5307185002/.
14

See What We Know, supra note 1; George Floyd: What Happened, supra note 1.

15

Janie Haseman, Karina Zaiets, Mitchell Thorson, Carlie Procell, George Petras & Shawn
J. Sullivan, Tracking Protests Across the USA in the Wake of George Floyd’s Death, USA
TODAY (updated June 18, 2020, 6:48 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/indepth/graphics/2020/06/03/map-protests-wake-george-floyds-death/5310149002/.
16

See Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, Trump Sent the Feds to Quash Portland’s Protests: What
We Know Amid the Nightly Turmoil, OREGONIAN (July 25, 2020),
https://www.oregonlive.com/news/2020/07/trump-sent-the-feds-to-quash-portlandsprotests-what-we-know-amid-the-nightly-turmoil.html; Kevin Liptak, Trump Announces
‘Surge’ of Federal Officers to Chicago As He Campaigns on ‘Law and Order’ Mantle,
CNN.COM
(updated
July
22,
2020,
6:45
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/22/politics/donald-trump-federal-law-enforcement-chicagoalbuquerque/index.html (describing orders to send federal officers to Chicago, Kansas City,
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quell civil unrest, these troops frequently resorted to physical violence and
largely failed to bring any peace to cities where they were deployed.17 In
Portland, Oregon—the epicenter of Trump’s federal response—local
police reported 6,283 uses of force during protests between May and the
end of September 2020.18 Federal troops “cleared Portland city streets
alongside Portland police” and participated in the pervasive violence.19
Among other actions, federal units deployed in Portland fired canisters of
military-style Maximum Smoke HC Grenades at crowds of civilians.20
Smoke produced by the canisters causes “nausea, vomiting, central nervous
system depression, and kidney and liver damage.”21 The HC grenades also
and Albuquerque); Trump Says U.S. Will Crack Down on Anti-Racism Protests in
Democratic-led
U.S.
Cities,
CBC
(July
20,
2020,
10:46
AM),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/portland-protest-us-crackdown-anti-racism-1.5655893
(reporting Trump’s stated plans to send law enforcement to cities in light of “anti-racism
protests,” including New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Baltimore, and Oakland).
17

See Kavanaugh, supra note 16 (“Weeks of raucous demonstrations had nearly wound down
in Portland . . . . Then President Donald Trump sent in federal forces. The protests against
police violence and systemic racism quickly grew bigger and louder.”); Trevor Hughes &
Lindsay Schnell, ‘This is Not a Dictatorship’: Portland Protestors Push Back Harder
Against Trump, Federal Agents, USA TODAY (updated July 23, 2020, 5:04 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/07/22/portland-protests-grow-largerafter-trump-sends-feds/5483028002/; see also Robert Evans, Opinion: Portland is Living in
America’s Terrifying Future, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 28, 2020, 8:27 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/portland-america-trump-future-police-fbi-riots-borderpatrol-protests-2020-10 (“Federal law enforcement entered the picture in July . . . . Shortly
after arriving, one of the Marshals shot activist Donovan Labella in the face with a rubber
bullet, shattering his skull and nearly killing him.”).
18

Maxine Bernstein, Portland Police Report 6,283 Uses of Force During Protests in 2020,
But Data Has Significant Gaps, OREGONIAN (updated Nov. 17, 2020),
https://www.oregonlive.com/crime/2020/11/portland-police-report-6283-uses-of-forceduring-protests-in-2020-yet-consultant-found-significant-gaps-in-force-reports.html.
19

Conrad Wilson & Jonathan Levinson, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Deployed to
Portland Protests, OR. PUB. BROAD. (updated July 7, 2020, 9:53 AM),
https://www.opb.org/news/article/federal-law-enforcement-agencies-deployed-to-portlandprotests-federal-buildings-personnel/.
20

Sharon Lerner, Federal Agents Used Toxic Chemical Smoke Grenades in Portland,
INTERCEPT (Oct. 10, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/10/10/portland-teargas-chemical-grenades-protests/.
21

Id.
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released zinc chloride, which can cause “fever, chest pain, and liver damage,
and is associated with anorexia, fatigue, and weight loss.”22
Despite these military-like tactics by federal agents in the city, the
protests remained remarkably peaceful. One example was the “Wall of
Moms,” organized by Bev Barnum,23 who responded to Floyd’s last words
as a call to his own mother.24 Concerned by the federal government’s sudden
presence in Portland, Barnum was adamant: “Let’s make it clear that we will
protect protesters without the use of violence, we will shine a light of the
unjust narrative being thrown around.”25 Initially, nearly 40 mothers—mostly
“upper-middle-class white women” who had previously stood on the
sidelines—responded to Barnum’s call, educating themselves about racial
injustice and lining up on the front lines of protests in Portland to chant “Feds
stay clear, moms are here.”26 Larger numbers of mothers gathered the
following evening. Within a week, hundreds of moms joined to make their
stand, many dressed in yellow and carrying sunflowers.27
A wall of concerned mothers offered “little protection once the federal
officers started firing teargas and flash-bangs and charging with batons,”
however.28 On July 11, protester Donavan La Bella was shot in the forehead
with an impact munition, leaving him with a fractured skull.29 On July 21, a
reporter “watched as blood streamed down Andre Miller’s face after he was

22

Id.

23

Chris McGreal, ‘I Wanted to Take Action’: Behind the ‘Wall of Moms’ Protecting
Portland’s Protesters, GUARDIAN (July 21, 2020, 2:53 PM), www.theguardian.com/usnews/2020/jul/21/trump-federal-agents-portland-protests-moms.
24

Lonnae O’Neal, George Floyd’s Mother Was Not There, But He Used Her as a Sacred
Invocation,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(MAY
30,
2020),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/2020/05/george-floyds-mother-not-there-heused-her-as-sacred-invocation.
25

Id.; McGreal, supra note 23.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Sarah Jeong, The Battle of Portland, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 3, 2020),
https://newrepublic.com/article/159169/battle-portland-protests-federal-agents-racistpolice-violence.
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struck in the head right below his helmet.”30 On July 25, Kristen JessieUyanik, a woman standing with the Wall of Moms, was struck in the forehead
just above her left eye.31 “Trump’s troops,” as some protesters took to calling
the federal agents facing them in Portland’s streets,32 reappeared night after
night. For four continuous weeks, the “federal occupation” of Portland
became “an all-consuming vortex of conflict.”33
President Trump’s decision to deploy federal troops, the manner in
which he determined to do so, and the actions those troops took once on the
ground in Portland raise numerous legal questions. Their importance to our
constitutional democracy is hard to overstate. This Article attempts to address
those concerns in three parts. Part I provides background on the federal
Executive Branch and President Trump’s use of an Executive Order to deploy
troops in Portland. Part II analyzes the growing powers of the Executive,
specifically under the Insurrection Act of 1807, which last summer’s historic
events confirm includes the power to deploy federal troops domestically
without the consent of either Congress or State or local governments. Part III
addresses the civil liberties at stake in such a scheme, as well as the likely
results of judicial intervention should similar issues arise in the future. Our
hope in writing this essay is to inspire Americans to get or stay involved in
protecting their unalienable rights. Democracy cannot be allowed to
decrescendo.
I. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: SCOPE OF POWERS & DEPARTMENTAL ACTION
Federal troops arrived in Portland after President Trump issued an
Executive Order on June 26, 2020, authorizing the Attorney General and the
Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to send federal personnel to
“assist with the protection of Federal monuments, memorials, statues, or

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

See McGreal, supra note 23.

33

Jeong, supra note 29.
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property.”34 The nature of that Order, and the President’s power to proclaim
it, are the subject of this first part.
A. The President, the Balance of Powers, and Executive Orders
The Constitution provides for concurrent authority between the States
and federal government, and at the federal level a basic tri-branch structure
for the United States government. Each branch may exercise only the limited
powers permitted by the Constitution.35 Article I grants Congress “[a]ll
legislative Powers” outlined in the federal charter.36 Article II vests in the
president “the executive Power.”37 Article III gives “judicial Power” to the
United States Supreme Court and “such inferior Courts as Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.”38 The Founding Fathers intentionally
chose this structure to create a system of checks and balances.39 Each branch
must share power with the others. Within the spheres of the federal
government’s purview, the United States is guaranteed independence “from
any control by the respective States.”40 Meanwhile, any powers “not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”41 The
distribution of powers among the federal branches and between the federal
and state governments are the foundations of our federalist system.
34

Exec. Order No. 13933, Protecting American Monuments, Memorials, and Statues and
Combating Recent Criminal Violence, 85 Fed. Reg. 40081, 40081–84 (issued June 26, 2020).
35

See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176 (1803) (“The powers of [the branches] are
defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution
is written.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (“The
Constitution limits [the President’s] functions in the lawmaking process . . . [and] is neither
silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute.”).
36

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.

37

Id. art. II, § 1.

38

Id. art. III, § 1.

39

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (“[T]he
greatest security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachment of the others.”).
40

Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020).

41

U.S. Const. amend. X.
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The limited authority of the federal Executive is among the most
important features of this design. The President “occupies a unique position
in the constitutional scheme.”42 Her duties “range from faithfully executing
the laws to commanding the Armed Forces, [and] are of unrivaled gravity and
breadth.”43 Today, in addition to commanding the “largest military
establishment on earth,” the President also controls a “colossal array of
agencies” that form the modern administrative state.44 Yet “[i]n contrast to a
king, who is born to power and can ‘do no wrong,’ the President of the United
States is ‘of the people’ and subject to the law.”45 Thus, even the President is
subject to restrictions.
Despite these limitations, President Trump acted unilaterally in sending
federal troops to Portland. Officers were deployed by means of Executive
Order commanding actions by various federal agencies.46 The Order, entitled
“Protecting American Monuments, Memorials, and Statues and Combating
Recent Criminal Violence,” among other things authorized the Attorney
General and the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to send
federal personnel to “assist with the protection of Federal monuments,
memorials, statues, or property.”47 This was necessary, the Order declared, to
resist a weeks-long “sustained assault on the life and property of civilians,
law enforcement officers, governmental property, and revered American
monuments.”48 The President theorized that these acts were carried out by
“rioters, arsonists, and left-wing extremists,” many of whom he believed
“explicitly identified themselves with ideologies—such as Marxism—that
call for the destruction of the United States system of government.” The
President did not cite Portland in particular. Instead, he declared that
“[a]narchists and left-wing extremists” were promoting a “fringe ideology
42

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).

43

Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2425.

44

Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1728 (1996).

45

Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2422.

46

See Exec. Order No. 13933, 85 Fed. Reg. 40081, 40083 (ordering actions by the Attorney
General, the Secretaries of the Interior, Homeland Security, and Defense, and “heads of all
executive departments and agencies”).
47

Id. § 5.

48

Id. § 1.
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that paints the United States of America as fundamentally unjust and have
sought to impose that ideology on Americans through violence and mob
intimidation.”49 Citing protests surrounding federally-maintained
monuments in San Francisco, Charlotte, and Boston, the Order surmised that
“State and local governments appear to have lost the ability to distinguish
between the lawful exercise of rights to free speech and assembly and
unvarnished vandalism.”50 To the President’s mind, that “abdication of . . .
law enforcement responsibilities” by State and local governments meant
Trump’s own, federal administration needed to end the “violent assault”
instead.51
Generally speaking, Executive Orders like Trump’s No. 13933 are an
exercise of the President’s Article II authority under the “Take Care Clause,”
which grants the President power to ensure that the laws of the United States
are “faithfully executed.”52 They are a regular feature of the modern
presidency.53 Executive Orders can be implemented quickly, have the force
of law, and frequently require federal agencies to respond within their
administrative capacities.54 They often take the form of proclamations with
broad, “profound” ramifications.55 Presidents have historically taken “an

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5; Melina T. Olivierio, The Role of the Executive in
Rulemaking, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 715, 716 (2018); see also Lorraine Boissoneault, The
Debate Over Executive Orders Began with Teddy Roosevelt’s Mad Passion for
Conservation,
SMITHSONIAN
MAG.
(Apr.
17,
2017),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-theodore-roosevelts-executive-ordersreshaped-countryand-presidency-180962908/ (describing the nature and several significant
historical uses of the executive order).
53

See Olivierio, supra note 52, at 717 (noting that every president except Harrison, who died
after thirty-one days in office, has “exercised his right to use executive orders”).
54

Id. at 716. Although guidelines require that the President receive financial approval from
the Office of Management and Budget and legal review from the Attorney General, there are
no consequences for failure to follow that form. Id. Even when followed precisely, moreover,
this arrangement is “still quicker” than almost any action conceivable by Congress. Id.
55

Boissoneault, supra note 52. President Trump’s Executive Order No. 13933 in particular
contains sweeping statements about the “policies” of the federal government and the purpose
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expansive view of their own power when it suits them, and use executive
orders to expand the boundaries of their authority.”56
In theory, these executive orders are subject to judicial review, consistent
with the federal government’s tri-branch structure and balance of powers.57
Whether the judiciary assesses executive orders with true neutrality,
however, is often either bolstered or stymied by who heads the Executive
Branch.58 Because a court that checks the power of the President must rely
on the Executive Branch to then enforce the court’s ruling, these are cases in
which the courts are “most vulnerable.”59 The executive-judicial relationship
thus substantially effects judicial decision making.60 More often than not,
courts uphold presidential directives, either on their merits or on
jurisdictional grounds, such as that a plaintiff lacks standing or that the issue
involves a nonjusticiable political question.61 For instance, a study conducted
in 1999 found that federal courts had struck down just fourteen executive
orders, wholly overturning only two.62 Courts typically avoid interference,

and necessity for swift, far-reaching federal action. See Exec. Order No. 13933, 85 Fed. Reg.
40081, 40082–83 (June 26, 2020).
56

Kenneth R. Mayer, Executive Orders and Presidential Power, 61 J. POL. 445, 448 (1999).

57

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

58

See Gbemende Johnson, Executive Power and Judicial Deference, 68 POL. RSCH. Q. 128,
129 (2015) (demonstrating that “court institutional vulnerability,” which varies between the
federal and state governments as well as among states, “can constrain judicial decision
making and affect whether courts uphold executive action”).
59

Id. at 130 (citing WILLIAM HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF
DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 139 (2003)).
60

See id.

61

Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in ModernDay America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 60 (2002).
62

Id. at 59. The two wholesale reversals were Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579, better known as
the Steel Seizure case, and Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996),
which struck down President Clinton’s 1995 executive order that federal contracts not be
awarded to employers who permanently replace employees who strike. Id.; Mayer, supra
note 56.
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even when an executive order is “of—at best—dubious constitutional
authority or issued without specific statutory authority.”63
B. Protecting American Monuments, Memorials, and Statues and
Combating Recent Criminal Violence - Authorization & Agency Action
President Trump’s Executive Order No. 13933 is an example of a
president’s “expansive view of [his] own power.”64 To start, the title of the
Order does not match the content of the mandate nor the scope of the actions
that officers within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took in
Portland under its purported authority.65 The full text of the Order moreover
sheds light on the political reasons that motivated Executive intervention,
namely, “rioters, arsonists, and left-wing extremists who . . . have explicitly
identified themselves with ideologies—such as Marxism—that call for the
destruction of the United States system of government.”66 Although
nominally about protecting federal property, the Order lists no monuments,
memorials, or statues in Portland specifically.67 News sources indicate that
federal officers were sent to Portland to protect three U.S. courthouses.68 But
protestors in Portland recorded videos and provided personal accounts of
their detention by federal authorities, confirming that the President’s troops
were “not simply protecting federal property, and part of the reason for that

63

Mayer, supra note 56, at 448 (quoting Joel L. Fleishman & Arthur H. Aufses, Law and
Orders: The Problem of Presidential Legislation, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5 (1976))
(alterations omitted).
64

See id.

65

Compare Exec. Order No. 13933, 85 Fed. Reg. 40081, 40081 (June 26, 2020) (entitling
the order), with, e.g., supra notes 17–22 (describing violent tactics employed by federal
agents on the ground) and infra note 69 (same).
66

Exec. Order No. 13933, 85 Fed. Reg. 40081, 40081.

67

See generally id. at 40081–84.

68

See Steve Vladeck, Are the Trump Administration’s Actions in Portland Legal? Are They
Constitutional?,
WASH.
POST
(July
25,
2020,
5:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/07/25/are-trump-administrations-actionsportland-legal-are-they-constitutional/.
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is the president himself and the high-ranking officials in DHS have not made
[protecting federal property] the primary rationale.”69
A more cautious president might have predicted that federal officers
within DHS would fail to adhere to a more limited mandate.70 The
Department of Homeland Security is an agency within the Executive Branch
that is charged with handling terrorist threats.71 Created in 2002 by the
Homeland Security Act,72 DHS was “born from the commitment and resolve
of Americans across the United States in the wake of the September 11th
attacks.”73 Consistent with that origin, DHS’s anti-terrorist efforts were
initially focused on international threats such as Al Qaeda; however, the
department’s mission has expanded beyond foreign terrorist organizations
and now addresses threats posed by domestic actors.74 The Department’s
broadened agenda was outlined explicitly in its 2019 Strategic Framework
for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence, which acknowledges the
ongoing threat posed by foreign terrorist organizations but focuses instead on

69

Kristine Phillips, Kevin Johnson & Trevor Hughes, ‘What a Disaster’: Aggressive Federal
Response in Portland Raises Legal Questions, USA TODAY (July 21, 2020 5:03PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/21/portland-protests-trumpadministration-response-raises-legal-questions/5481418002/ (quoting the assessment of
Michael Dorf, professor of constitutional law at Cornell University).
70

See Evans, supra note 17 (“One of the most violent federal units sent to Portland were the
men of the Border Patrol’s elite Bortac unit. . . . ‘They don’t exist within the realm of civilian
law enforcement. They view people they encounter in the military sense as enemy
combatants, meaning they have virtually no rights,’ [a former Border Patrol agent] told the
Guardian. . . . They are soldiers, not cops, and the difference between the two was readily
apparent.”).
71

See 6 U.S.C. § 111 (establishing the Department of Homeland Security as an “executive
agency” charged with the “primary mission” of preventing, reducing, minimizing the damage
of, and assisting the United States in the recovery of “terrorist attacks within the United
States”).
72

Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.

73

Mission, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 3, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/mission.

74

See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM
TARGETED
VIOLENCE
8–10
(Sept.
2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0920_plcy_strategic-frameworkcountering-terrorism-targeted-violence.pdf.
AND
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the “growing threat from domestic terrorism and other threats originating at
home.”75
DHS defines domestic terrorism extremely broadly. The 2019 Strategic
Framework offers this definition: “an act of unlawful violence, or a threat of
force or violence, that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of
critical infrastructure or key resources, and is intended to effect societal,
political, or other change, committed by a group or person based and
operating entirely within the United States or its territories.”76 By contrast,
Congress used a more precise definition when forming DHS in the Homeland
Security Act, stating:
The term “terrorism” means any activity that involves an act that is
dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical
infrastructure or key resources; and is a violation of [federal or state
criminal law]; and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government
by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.77
DHS’s definition thus omits concepts of intimidation and coercion,
substituting a general intention to effect change for Congress’s more specific
language. That has allowed DHS to maintain that anti-authority groups, rather
than being contributors to the political debate over methods of governance,
may be viewed as threats to national security.78
Combined with President Trump’s Executive Order, DHS’s lax
definition of domestic terrorism gave DHS enormous leeway to address
protests in America’s cities. Within a week, Acting Secretary of Homeland
Security Chad Wolf announced a task force to coordinate DHS law
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Id. at ii.
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Id. at 4 n.6.
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6 U.S.C. § 101(18) (emphasis added). This definition also tracks the definition of domestic
terrorism used by Congress in the Patriot Act, now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).
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See DHS Announces New Task Force to Protect American Monuments, Memorials, and
Statues, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (July 1, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2020/07/01/dhsannounces-new-task-force-protect-american-monuments-memorials-and-statues
(describing protestors as “violent anarchists”).
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enforcement agency assets in response to Trump’s directives.79 In a press
release, Wolf indicated the task force—Protect American Monuments,
Memorials, and Statues (PACT)—would conduct “ongoing assessments of
potential civil unrest or destruction and allocate resources to protect people
and property.”80 Those “resources” included Rapid Deployment Teams,
which were “pre-positioned . . . across the country to respond to potential
threats to facilities and property.”81
In theory, the deployment of federal personnel was both consistent with
President Trump’s Order and statutorily authorized. Chapter 40 of the United
States Code tasks the Secretary of Homeland Security with protecting the
“buildings, grounds, and property that are owned, occupied, or secured by the
Federal Government,” as well as persons on those properties.82 The statute
permits the Secretary to designate “officers and agents for duty” who may
carry firearms, make arrests without a warrant for offenses against the United
States, serve warrants and subpoenas issued under the authority of the United
States, investigate possible offenses against federally-owned or occupied
properties, both “on and off the property in question,” and “such other
activities for the promotion of homeland security as the Secretary may
prescribe.”83 Wolf was determined to use these vast, police-like powers to
respond to the President’s command. “We won’t stand idly by while violent
anarchists and rioters seek not only to vandalize and destroy the symbols of
our nation, but to disrupt law and order and sow chaos in our communities,”
he said.84
As DHS officers and agents in Portland demonstrated, however,
President Trump’s Executive Order was interpreted by Acting DHS Secretary
Wolf as authorizing aggressive anti-terrorist methods usually deployed to
address violent threats to American society on ordinary American citizens.
By equating foreign terrorist organizations and US citizens engaged in
protests, even those who might subscribe to fringe ideology, DHS brought
79

Id.
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40 U.S.C. § 1315(a).
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Id. at § 1315(b)(2).
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their broad scope of tools originally meant to fight the “terrorism and targeted
violence” of groups like al Qaeda to bear against citizens and other residents
of the United States who espoused left-leaning ideologies.
Treating protestors like terrorists may have been precisely the point.
Throughout the Portland protests, President Trump superimposed his own
political messaging on DHS’ deployment of officers and those officers’ antiterrorist tactics.85 That influence worked within DHS, as well. A
whistleblower complaint from within the Department reveals that the
President and political appointees within DHS attempted to “modify”
intelligence assessments about domestic terrorism to match President
Trump’s rhetoric.86 President Trump and his political appointees, including
Acting Homeland Security Secretary Wolf, tried to downplay the threat posed
by White Supremacists and instead play up the “prominence of violent ‘leftwing’ groups.”87 Among other actions, Wolf specifically attempted to include
information about the unrest in Portland within DHS’s intelligence
materials.88 When the Principal Deputy Under Secretary in the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis resisted that move, he was demoted, despite twenty
85

See, e.g.,
@realDonaldTrump,
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12,
2020,
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instantaneously.”); @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Oct. 12, 2020, 7:34 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1315616788986712065 (“Put these animals in
jail, now!”); @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Oct. 12, 2020, 7:41 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1315618688612159489
(“ANTIFA
RADICALS. Get them FBI, and get them now!”); @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Oct. 12,
2020, 7:59 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1315623184729858048 (“The
FBI and Law Enforcement must focus their energy on ANTIFA and the Radical Left, those
who have spent the summer trying to burn down poorly run Democrat Cities throughout the
USA!”); see also Judge in Portland Cites Trump Tweets in Restricting Feds at Protests,
SEATTLE TIMES (updated Nov. 1, 2020, 2:01 PM), seattletimes.com/seattlenews/northwest/judge-cites-trump-tweets-in-restricting-feds-at-protests/ (describing one
judge’s determination that the President’s tweets “helped incite improper conduct by federal
officers responding to racial justice demonstrations in Portland”).
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Whistleblower Reprisal Complaint at 13, In re: Murphy (Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Office
of Inspector General Sept. 8, 2020), https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/homelandsecurity-whistleblower/0819ec9ee29306a5/full.pdf.
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years of public service.89 The President’s insistence on first proposing and
then investigating unsubstantiated classifications of domestic threats has
extended to other federal agencies, as well. As recently as the autumn of
2020, the FBI confirmed that it was targeting for investigation the “extremist
‘Antifa’ demonstrators who engaged in recent violent protests.”90
II. THE EXPANSIVE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
President Trump’s politicization of domestic security threats,
exemplified by his Executive Order, is just one example of growing
Executive power in the United States. Despite the limitations on the
President’s powers in the Constitution and in the spheres of the several States,
every presidential administration has expanded the President’s role.
The push for broad Executive powers is not new. As president, Thomas
Jefferson refused to enforce the Alien Sedition Acts of 1798 and ordered that
prosecutions under the law be discontinued, as he “affirm[ed] that act to be
no law, because in opposition to the Constitution.”91 His refusal to enforce
legislation enacted by Congress rested on his own broad vision of his role as
Chief Executive.92 More than two hundred years later, President Barack
Obama continued that tradition by openly denouncing the Defense of
Marriage Act93 and imploring the Supreme Court to issue an “authoritative
ruling” of the act’s unconstitutionality.94 The Court agreed to hear the case,
89

Id.

90

Mark Hosenball & Sarah N. Lynch, FBI Chief Says U.S. ‘Antifa’ Demonstrators Are
Targets
of
Multiple
Probes,
REUTERS
(Sept.
24,
2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/instant-article/idUKL2N2GL1FC.
91

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Nov. 1, 1801), in 8 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 57–58 n.1 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897) (regarding the nolle
prosequi entered in the case brought against William Duane under the Sedition Act).
92

See id. (“The President is to have the laws executed. He may order an offense then to be
prosecuted. If he sees a prosecution put into a train which is not lawful, he may order it to be
discontinued and so put into legal train. I found a prosecution going on against Duane . . .
founded on the sedition act. . . . and I shall treat it as a nullity, wherever it comes in the way
of my functions.”).
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Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419.
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See Nat Stern, Separation of Powers, Executive Authority, and Suspension of Disbelief, 54
HOUS. L. REV. 125, 159–60 (2016).
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greatly enhancing the Executive’s authority and effectively permitting
presidents to “direct the path of the law.”95
Presidents have not only refused to implement enacted legislation,
playing a form of presidential defense against laws with which they disagree.
Presidents have also played offense by circumventing Congress entirely. The
most disconcerting example is the expansion of the President’s powers as
Commander and Chief, where Congress and the States have essentially
become powerless to check the President’s authority. Although the
Constitution makes the President the “Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States” and of the State militias “when called into the
actual Service of the United States,”96 the term “commander in chief” was
not uniformly defined in eighteenth century law, and generally meant merely
the highest person in a particular chain of command.97 Some states used the
term close in time to the ratification of the U.S. Constitution to refer to
individuals “subordinate to another ultimate decision maker,” such as Esek
Hopkins of Rhode Island, who was named “commander-in-chief” of “the
fleet” in 1776.”98 The President’s powers as Commander in Chief are
accordingly not necessarily so sweeping as to put the Executive above the
other branches of the federal government in matters of war.
The structure of the Constitution confirms the point. “Consistent with a
narrow understanding of ‘Commander in Chief,’ Article I gives Congress the
power to ‘raise and support Armies,’ to make rules for ‘the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces,’ and to ‘declare War, grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water.’”99 Thus declarations of war, the raising and support of armies, and
the regulation of those troops are all powers exclusively granted to the
Legislative Branch, not the President. A former commander-in-chief “whose
accomplishments were particularly well known to the framers” probably
understood that Congress would play a large role in war; George Washington,
95

Id. at 160.

96

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation: The
Commander in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. REV. 61, 83 (2007).
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Id.
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Id. at 84 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
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“acting under the title of commander in chief during the Revolutionary War,
looked to Congress to manage many aspects of the conduct of war.”100 Use
of the “same title in the Constitution” suggests the president was expected to
enjoy approximately the same war powers as Washington had during the
Revolutionary War, unless some other provision of the Constitution
broadened his powers more explicitly.101
But the idea that Congress alone can dictate whether and how war will
be waged no longer stands in the United States. When President Richard
Nixon sought to invade Cambodia in 1970, William Rehnquist, then an
Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, authored a memo
assuring Nixon that his actions were “authorized under even a narrow reading
of his power as Commander in Chief.”102 Rehnquist urged that the President
should have no concern taking military action without congressional
permission, writing:
It is too plain . . . to admit of denial that the Executive, under his
power as Commander in Chief, is authorized to commit American
forces in such a way as to seriously risk hostilities, and also to
actually commit them to such hostilities, without prior congressional
approval. . . . [The] constitutional practice must include executive
resort to Congress in order to obtain its sanction for the conduct of
hostilities which reach a certain scale. Constitutional practice also
indicates, however, that congressional sanction need not be in the
form of a declaration of war.103
Today, President Trump would no doubt find much agreeable in
Rehnquist’s memo. The President’s power as Commander and Chief,
whatever its original contours, has been validated as an expansive prerogative
to deploy force at whim without authorization by any other branch of
government. The violence in Portland moreover demonstrates a frightening
aspect of this overbroad power, which is not limited to international conflicts.
100

Id. at 83.

101

See id.

102
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103

Id. at 331–32.

137

A NATION JOINS IN TEARS
Under the Insurrection Act of 1807,104 Congress itself gave the Executive the
ability to deploy troops on the American people in their own towns and
neighborhoods.
A. The Insurrection Act of 1807
The Insurrection Act is a long-standing and often-invoked American law
which President Trump has considered invoking to justify his use of federal
troops in Portland.105 Currently codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55, the law
permits the President to use the armed forces to suppress “insurrection[s],”
“rebellion[s],” and “domestic violence” that interfere with the execution of
the laws of a State or of the United States.106 Many Americans presently think
the law prohibits the use of federal troops on American soil.107 “They also
believe that the President has to wait until a governor asks for help before he
can send federal troops to help and even only to quell an insurrection. These
beliefs are erroneous.”108 While a separate law in Title 18 of the United States
Code criminalizes use of the armed forces “as a posse comitatus”—
essentially prohibiting use of the U.S. military as a police force109—the
Insurrection Act is a “statutory exception” to that law.110 Today, “the
Insurrection Act stands, and it permits the President to use federal troops to
enforce the laws either at the request of a governor or on the initiative of the
President.”111
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See Rebecca Kheel, House Votes to Curtail Insurrection Act Powers, THE HILL (July 20,
2020), 2020 WL 4059507.
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The Act is rooted in the earliest history of the United States during
George Washington’s presidency. It was first inspired by the Calling Forth
Act of 1792, which gave Washington authority “to call forth the militia when
in his judgment they were needed to repel invasions, suppress insurrections,
or enforce the laws.”112 Ever hesitant of the power of kings, the second
Congress was reluctant to give this power to a president, and so specified that
“before using the troops, the President would have to issue a proclamation
calling on the insurgents to disperse in a limited time.”113 The Calling Forth
Act further specified that domestic insurrections could be quelled with federal
forces only upon approval “by an associate justice, or the district judge.”114
The powers delegated to the Executive to employ military force in domestic
emergencies were thus “circumscribed in many ways,” requiring cooperation
from state authorities and the federal judiciary.115
In practice, the 1792 Act proved flawed. Already that year Washington
was faced with protests over the federal government’s first domestic product
tax, known today as the Whisky Rebellion.116 The civil unrest concerned
Washington; he feared the protests in Pennsylvania in particular would lead
the newly formed nation back into a revolutionary war.117 The situation on
the American frontier did not precisely fit the requirements of the Calling
Forth Act, however.118 Washington’s cabinet accordingly asked Congress to
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Brinkerhoff, supra note 107, at 5. See also An Act to provide for calling forth the militia
to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, Pub. L. 2-28,
1 Stat. 264 (1792).
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See id. at 192–93. In particular, the 1792 Act “required certification by a Supreme Court
justice that the situation was beyond the control of civil authority before troops could be
called to the central government’s aid.” Id. Taking advantage of this limitation on the
President’s authority, representatives from Pennsylvania “uncooperatively asserted that the
judicial power was equal to the task of quelling and punishing the riots,” thereby suggesting
that federal intervention was neither necessary nor justified. Id. at 193. Washington’s
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grant the President more discretion. Congress complied in 1795, passing an
updated law that gave the President “specific authority to call forth the militia
upon the request of a governor or state legislature, if the governor were unable
to apply for the assistance,” eliminating both the necessity of judicial
determination that federal intervention was warranted and the sunset date on
the original 1792 law.119 Though broad, the President’s powers under the
updated law, today known as the Militia Act of 1795, still did not allow the
Executive to use federal troops on domestic soil at will. The President was
permitted to employ the “militia” but not “federal troops,” for one.120
The Act was next expanded at the request of President Thomas Jefferson
in response to the threat posed by Aaron Burr. Following his tenure as
Jefferson’s Vice President, Burr had apparently begun plotting to raise an
army and establish his own dynasty in either the Louisiana Territory or
Mexico.”121 Jefferson consulted his Secretary of State, James Madison, to
determine whether the Constitution gave him the ability to send federal troops
to quash Burr’s plans.122 Madison responded in a letter quoting the Calling
Forth Acts of 1792 and 1795.123 His analysis was succinct: “It does not appear
that regular Troops can be employed, under any legal provision [against]
insurrections—but only [against] expeditions having foreign Countries for
the object[.]”124 In search of a legitimate, constitutional source of authority to
send the federal armed forces to quell Burr’s plot, Jefferson asked Congress
administration was ultimately able to satisfy the 1792 Act’s requirements, but were plagued
by the administrative and negotiations setbacks. See id. at 196.
119

Thaddeus Hoffmeister, An Insurrection Act for the Twenty-First Century, 39 STETSON L.
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forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;
and to repeal the Act now in force for those purposes, Pub. L. 3-36, 1 Stat. 424 (1795).
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and Jefferson’s response, see also Dave Roos, Thomas Jefferson Signed the Insurrection Act
in 1807 to Foil a Plot by Aaron Burr, HISTORY.COM (June 3, 2020),
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in December of 1806 to pass a bill authorizing the employment of the land
and Naval forces of the United States in cases of insurrection.125 Congress
responded with the Insurrection Act of 1807, granting the President the power
to call forth both federal and state forces in cases of insurrection.126 The
Insurrection Act apparently retained several of the earlier limitations on the
President’s powers included in the Calling Forth Act of 1792 and the Militia
Act of 1795, however. The language of the 1807 law permitted the Executive
to employ the United States military only “where it [would be] lawful for the
President . . . to call forth the militia.”127
The Insurrection Act was not, in the end, used against Burr.128 President
Jefferson first invoked the law in 1808 in response to information that
“sundry persons” were “confederating together on Lake Champlain . . . for
the purposes of forming insurrections against the authority of the United
States.”129 The conspiracy involved a group of American merchant ships
determined to avoid Jefferson’s trade embargo with the British.130
Enterprising, rebellious Americans had built “[i]mmense rafts of lumber,”
one of which was “near half a mile long [and] carried a ball-proof fort, and
was manned by five or six hundred armed men prepared to defy the customhouse officers.”131
The Act has been used and amended extensively since these early years.
In 1861 at the request of President Abraham Lincoln, the law was again
modified to increase Presidential authority to use the militia and federal
armed forces to suppress domestic insurrections.132 Passed as part of the
125
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(James D. Richardson ed., 1897).

AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 438–39
130

Roos, supra note 121.

131

HENRY ADAMS, 3 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 249 (Albert & Charles Boni 1930).
132

Brinkerhoff, supra note 107, at 5; Hoffmeister, supra note 119, at 887.

141

A NATION JOINS IN TEARS
larger Suppression of the Rebellion Act,133 the law gave the President
unfettered discretion to determine when it was “impracticable to enforce the
laws by the ordinary course of judicial procedures,” greatly strengthening the
Executive’s power and providing Lincoln with a legal basis for deploying
troops against the rebellious South during the Civil War.134 The amendment
allowed Lincoln to deploy federal troops on his own initiative and act on his
own judgment without waiting for a request from a governor or a certification
that judicial authorities were insufficient.135 The amendment also added
“rebellion against the authority of the government of the United States” to the
list of contingencies under which the President could act.136
The law was amended again during Reconstruction, this time at the
request of President Ulysses S. Grant.137 The former Union general, now the
elected Commander in Chief of the United States’ military forces,
approached Congress in 1870 to urge the necessity of “reimposing military
rule . . . in those sections of the readmitted states where the [Ku Klux] Klan
enjoyed virtual hegemony” after the formal end of military conflict during
the Civil War.138 Congress responded in 1871 by granting the President
authority to use federal troops or the militia to respond to “insurrection,
domestic violence, unlawful combinations, or conspiracies” in the States that
would “deprive any portion or class of the people of [the States] any of the
rights, privileges, or immunities, or protection, named in the Constitution and
secured by [the law]” whenever state authorities “fail in or refuse protection
of the people in such rights.”139 Along with the original grants of authority
under the Insurrection Act, these provisions were famously invoked by
133
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President Dwight Eisenhower in 1957 when he sent the 101st Airborne
Division to enforce the desegregation of public schools in Little Rock,
Arkansas.140
More recently, the Insurrection Act has changed from Eisenhower’s
usage. Instead of enforcing civil rights, Presidents have invoked the Act to
quell civil rights protesters—specifically, protests against police violence. In
1992, when violence erupted in Los Angeles following the acquittal of four
police officers charged in the beating of Rodney King, President George
H.W. Bush invoked the Act in response to the governor of California’s
request for federal assistance quelling the widespread riots.141 In many ways,
the civil unrest in 1992 mirrors the 2020 protests in Portland. In both
circumstances, the President’s invocation of the Insurrection Act departed
from the Act’s original purpose of preventing the violent overthrow of the
government and instead effectively silenced citizens who reacted to the
deaths of black persons at the hands of the police.
Yet important distinctions remain. President Bush employed the
Insurrection Act only after receiving an explicit request from California’s
governor; President Trump instead circumvented the authority of Oregon’s
governor by deploying federal personnel that were neither requested nor
desired.142 Portland authorities repeatedly beseeched the federal government
not to send any federal troops to their city.143 Despite their pleas, Trump sent
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troops by the tank-load.144 Whatever Congress’s past intentions for the
Insurrection Act, President Trump interpreted it as giving him the power to
deploy federal military troops and militia based on his subjective belief that
political activity had become violent civil unrest, and that local authorities
were unable to handle the crisis. That invocation does not stray far from
President Bush’s use of the Act. And unless the law is amended, the only
authority that might have invalidated his actions were the courts.145
B. Congress’s 2020 Proposed Amendment to the Insurrection Act of 1807
Congress reacted quickly to Trump’s unprecedented actions by
exploring ways to amend the Insurrection Act. On July 20, 2020, the House
approved language as part of a larger defense spending bill to amend the Act
by requiring that the President consult with Congress “in every possible
instance” before invoking the law.146 The Amendment would also have
required the President and the Secretary of Defense “certify to Congress that
a State is unable or unwilling to suppress an insurrection or domestic
violence, or that the State concerned is unable or unwilling to suppress an
unlawful rebellion against the authority of the United States,” in order to
invoke the law.147 That certification also would have required “demonstrable”
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Portland by the end of that month). Some federal agencies have expressed dismay at use of
the term “troops.” See, e.g., Myth vs. Fact: 50+ Nights of Violence, Chaos, and Anarchy in
Portland,
Oregon,
DEP’T
HOMELAND
SEC.
(July
27,
2020),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2020/07/27/myth-vs-fact-50-nights-violence-chaos-andanarchy-portland-oregon (insisting that “DHS personnel sent to protect federal facilities in
Portland are sworn civilian federal law enforcement officers, not active duty military
personnel”). To Portland residents who experienced military-based tactics and weapons, the
distinction is probably of little value.
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evidence that the State is unable or unwilling to act.148 Further suggested
amendments included language which specified that federal military
personnel deployed under the Act are prohibited from “direct participation”
in search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activities, unless “expressly
authorized by law.”149 Representative Veronica Escobar, a Democrat from
Texas who sponsored the amendment, explained its necessity: “Today, if the
president of the United States chooses to use military force abroad the
president would have to consult with Congress,” she explained. “Yet that
same consultation is not required for use of military force on American
soil.”150 Ultimately, the Senate’s amendment contained no similar provision,
and the House receded from the language in order to secure the other body’s
cooperation.151 The defense appropriations bill was passed into law over the
veto of President Trump on January 1, 2021, without any amendments to the
Insurrection Act.152
Congress’s inability to amend the Insurrection Act is disconcerting and
disappointing for many reasons. First, as a conceptual matter, the House’s
proposed amendment was congruent with the intent of the legislature when
the Act was initially ratified. As described above, the Sixth Congress passed
the Insurrection Act to address the unique conflict created by Aaron Burr.153
The Act retained specific limitations on the President’s power included in the
earlier Calling Forth Act of 1792 and Militia Act of 1795.154 These statutes
were forged in the fires of federalism and carefully attuned to the United
States’ government’s balance of powers in order to purposefully prevent
unfettered presidential use of federal troops within the United States. By
reinvigorating checks and balances between the Executive and Legislative
branches, the proposed amendment would have ensured the Insurrection Act
reverted to its original intended, far more limited purposes, rather than serve
148
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as an unchecked source of potential presidential authority to use the federal
military as internal police in American neighborhoods and cities.
III. CIVIL LIBERTIES & JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Without an amendment of the Insurrection Act from Congress, judicial
intervention is the only check left to ensure the Executive branch’s
interloping presence is not limitless. Moreover, even under the current law,
the mass arrests and use of violent force by federal agents in Portland
evidenced pervasive constitutional violations. Many protestors fear that by
exercising their unalienable constitutional rights they will face the same
retaliation and combat tactics from federal personnel who are trained and
equipped as a militarized national police force as the protesters in Portland..
The judiciary should not shy away from limiting the ever-expanding claims
to war powers made by the President, particularly where those claims infringe
on American’s constitutional rights.
A. Defining Insurrection in the Courts
In related areas of federal law, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
expand the definition of such nebulous terms as “insurrection.” The best
example is Herndon v. Lowry,155 a criminal case from 1937. In Herndon, the
defendant was charged with a violation of a Georgia state law that prohibited
the introduction, printing, or circulation of documents “for the purpose of
inciting insurrection.”156 He was convicted for communist solicitations,
specifically for “uniting, combining, and conspiring to incite riots and to
embarrass and impede the orderly processes of the courts and offering
combined resistance to, and, by force and violence, overthrowing and
defeating the authority of the state . . . by speech and persuasion.”157 The
defendant defended his actions by asserting that the cited statute was
unconstitutionally vague and unwarrantably invaded his rights under the
United States Constitution.158 Finding for the defendant, the Court held that
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“the limitation upon individual liberty must have appropriate relation to the
safety of the state. Legislation which goes beyond this need violates the
principle of the Constitution.”159 The Court held that the Georgia statute
must, as a matter of federal law, require that the defendant intend to use force
and violence towards the state, or intend that others would do so at his
bidding, before the state could criminalize the defendant’s exercise of his
constitutional rights.160
The Court’s holding is significant beyond the specifics of Georgia
statutory law because it makes clear the narrow scope of an “insurrection.”
The defendant’s conviction for speaking his political beliefs, without proof
that he was forcefully trying to overthrow the government, was not an
insurrection. This case demonstrates the Court’s recognition of the liberty
that protesters are latching onto in Portland. Peaceful protests and movements
for political organization, just as in Herndon, are not forms of insurrection
but speech.
The Court has not always taken such a circumscribed view, however,
particularly in cases interpreting the Insurrection Act itself. In Laird v.
Tatum,161 decided in 1972, the Justices deviated notably from the Court’s
earlier interpretation. The case concerned President Johnson’s order that
federal troops assist local authorities with the “civil disorders in Detroit,
Michigan, in the summer of 1967 and during the disturbances that followed
the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King.”162 To assist the federal troops’
coordination with local authorities, the federal government created a datagathering system that would “permit the Army, when called upon to assist
local authorities, to be able to respond effectively with a minimum of
force.”163 The system involved extensive collection of information about
public activities that the Army thought had “at least some potential for civil
disorder,” including notes from Army Intelligence agents who attended
public political organizing meetings.164 Though the recording system was
159
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extensive, the government contended that it was necessary, and that “reports
concerning civil disturbances [would] be limited to matters of immediate
concern to the Army—that is, reports concerning outbreaks of violence or
incidents with a high potential for violence beyond the capability of state and
local police and the National Guard to control.”165 Several individuals
brought a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the courts
end the government’s “surveillance of lawful and peaceful civilian political
activity.”166
Importantly, the Court held that the individuals’ associations and speech
could be “chilled” without directly violating their First Amendment rights.167
Writing for the Majority, Chief Justice Burger held that the petitioners’ claim,
“simply stated, is that they disagree with the judgments made by the
Executive Branch with respect to the type and amount of information the
Army needs and that the very existence of the Army’s data-gathering system
produces a constitutionally impermissible chilling effect upon the exercise of
their First Amendment rights.”168 But discomfort caused by the datagathering system was not an injury redressable by the judiciary, according to
the Court.169 It was “not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present or
immediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful government action,”
to “probe the Army’s intelligence-gathering activities” to determine “the
extent to which those activities may or may not be appropriate to the Army’s
mission.”170 In a nod to the petitioners, Chief Justice Burger wrote that the
petitioners’ argument was congruent with the “philosophical underpinnings
[which] explain our traditional insistence on limitations on military
operations in peacetime.”171 But despite the “traditional and strong resistance
of Americans to any military intrusion into civilian affairs,” the Laird Court
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did not find the federal government’s operations in violation of any
constitutionally guaranteed rights.172
In a strong dissent, Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Marshall,
explained why the majority’s holding was inconsistent with the liberties
afforded to American citizens.173 He was particularly disturbed by the
majority’s flippant allowance of the military into the civilian sector. “[A]larm
was sounded in the Constitutional Convention about the dangers of the armed
services,” he noted, which exist “not only in bold acts of usurpation of power,
but also in gradual encroachments.”174 He insisted that the American tradition
accordingly “reflects a desire for civilian supremacy and subordination of
military power.”175 Quoting the late Chief Justice Warren, Justice Douglas
noted that while “the military serves the vital function of preserving the
existence of the nation, . . . [i]n times of peace, the factors leading to an
extraordinary deference to claims of military necessity have naturally not
been as weighty.”176 Deployment of the military when the nation was not at
war, particularly to surveil American citizens, was therefore “a cancer on our
body politic.”177 While “[t]hose who already walk submissively will say there
is no cause for alarm,” he insisted, “submissiveness is not our heritage.”178
He accordingly would have enjoined the federal government’s use of military
intelligence against Americans at home, because the Constitution “was
designed to allow rebellion to remain as [America’s] heritage” and to “keep
the precincts of belief and expression . . . [and] of political and social
activities free from” government interference.179 There could be “no
influence more paralyzing” than military surveillance of American citizens,
he concluded.180
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Justice Douglas’s dissent foreshadowed the present-day conflict in
Portland. He insisted that “the exercise of military power, where the rights of
the citizen are concerned, [should] never be pushed beyond what the exigency
requires.”181 Otherwise, Douglas feared that “[t]he act of turning the military
loose on civilians[,] even if sanctioned by an Act of Congress . . . would raise
serious and profound constitutional questions. Standing as it does only on
brute power and Pentagon policy, it must be repudiated as a usurpation
dangerous to the civil liberties on which free men are dependent.”182 His
words highlight the dangerous disconnect between the government’s use of
force and individuals’ civil liberties, particularly when the U.S. military was
employed to police American citizens at home.
B. Due Process Guarantees
Justice Douglas’s dissent in Laird expressed repugnance for federal
military intrusion on civilian lives.183 His concern spanned many of the civil
liberties included in the Bill of Rights, and he insisted that even exigent
circumstances could not validate overbroad governmental action.
One of the civil rights implicated by the use domestically of federal
military force is the due process guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.184 The
Supreme Court grappled with this issue in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,185 decided in
the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.186 The case involved
the capture by U.S. military forces of an American citizen, alleged to be an
enemy combatant, who was held without any formal charges or the initiation
of any formal proceedings on a series of United States Navy brigs.187 The
citizen’s father petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.188 The United States
insisted that it was permitted to hold Hamdi “indefinitely” because “a series
181
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of U.S. military screening teams [had] determined that Hamdi met the criteria
for enemy combatants, and a subsequent interview of Hamdi . . . supports his
classification as an enemy combatant.”189
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion made clear that a United States
citizen—even one detained as an enemy combatant—must be given a
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for his detention and
exercise due process rights.190 Justice O’Connor maintained that while the
law under which Hamdi had been detained “provided procedures for
executive detention, during times of emergency, of individuals deemed likely
to engage in espionage or sabotage,”191 the “serious competing interests” at
stake required as a bare constitutional minimum that the government provide
notice of the factual basis for its detention and an opportunity to rebut those
assertions before an impartial authority.192 Citizens who are classified as
enemy combatants are no less American citizens, after all.193 Justice
O’Connor was furthermore swayed by Congress’s own concern with
preventing a “reprise [of] the Japanese-American internment camps of World
War II.”194 The “concentration camp implications” of permitting the U.S.
military to detain U.S. citizens without recourse to their constitutional rights
is “abhorrent,” as Congress recognized.195 Justice O’Connor therefore
reminded the Executive branch that American citizens cannot be deprived of
their due process rights, even in an emergency, merely to serve military
interests.196 The petitioner’s request for a writ of habeas corpus was
ultimately granted and his case was remanded so that the lower courts could
provide constitutionally-due process of the law.197
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Hamdi, though only a plurality opinion, displayed the Court’s awareness
of the dangers of regression into the federal government’s untrammeled
military control over civilian lives that the Court had so wrongly approved in
Korematsu v. United States during the height of World War II.198 At the core
of this danger is the historically-evident likelihood that the federal
government will arbitrarily punish citizens and strip them of their
fundamental liberties in its zeal to secure domestic tranquility. That Justice
O’Connor’s opinion in Hamdi was written at the height of the George H.W.
Bush administration’s War on Terror serves as a particularly strong warning
against relying on political prejudice or the contemporary fears of American
society to create substantive policies that trammel individual, fundamental
rights. However, the Court’s inability to come to a conscientious in Hamdi
leaves citizen’s due process rights in flux. Though the plurality understands
the need to preserve Fifth Amendment protections , the Court did not create
binding limits on the Executive branch’s ever expanding war powers.
Due process concerns are not only implicated by the federal
government’s military detention of American citizens, of course.
Constitutional violations are just as often hidden under the guise of evenhanded law. Accordingly, although no reports indicate that federal personnel
deployed by President Trump in Portland arrested American citizens and held
them in military custody, their actions included the arrest of numerous
civilians, not always clearly related to matters of federal concern.199
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Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), infamously affirmed the exclusion of
American citizens of Japanese ancestry from areas of the United States deemed important to
the military, and their imprisonment instead in “relocation centers,” based on the opinion of
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S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (internal quotation omitted).
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The idea that authorities might be overly vigilant about enforcing
vaguely defined laws is not new to the courts, and also implicates due process
concerns. In some instances, laws are too broad and allow for law
enforcement to be the arbitrators of the law’s application. One example is
City of Chicago v. Morales,200 in which the Supreme Court invalidated a
Chicago ordinance as unconstitutionally vague.201 The ordinance provided
that police who observed “a person whom [police] reasonably believes to be
a criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or more
persons” must “order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves
from the area.”202 Anyone who did not “promptly obey” was guilty of a
criminal offense.203 Because the ordinance did not proscribe in any particular
activity, giving police officers little guidance to determine who they would
cite under the law, the Court determined the statute wrongfully “entrusts
lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his
beat.”204 The Court was particularly concerned with giving the police the
power “to decide arbitrarily which members of the public they will order to
disperse” because the ordinance prevented a “substantial amount of innocent
conduct.”205 The “right to remove from one place to another according to
inclination,” for example, is “an attribute of personal liberty protected by the
Constitution.”206 Therefore, if “the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent,
the dispersal order itself [would be] an unjustified impairment of liberty.”207
The overly vague ordinance in Morales is reminiscent of the lack of
procedure present in Hamdi, as well as the actions of federal authorities in
arrests/. Cf. also Ryan Lucas, Review of Federal Charges in Portland Unrest Shows Most
Are
Misdemeanors,
NPR.ORG
(Sept.
5,
2020,
7:00
AM),
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Portland during the Summer of 2020. Whether by arbitrarily enforcing laws
so vague that individuals cannot understand in advance what conduct is
prohibited, as in Morales, or detaining individuals indefinitely without any
evidentiary or judicial proceedings, as in Hamdi, or arresting Americans for
petty misdemeanors outside the scope of the President’s Executive Order,208
as in Portland in 2020, the government violates Americans’ due process rights
and abdicates the rule of law.
The fear that the government might harm innocent individuals, and that
due process is necessary to safeguard the American people, is in the very
DNA of the United States. William Blackstone, the foremost authority on the
common law at the time of the ratification of the United States Constitution,
wrote that it was “better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer.”209 America’s Benjamin Franklin went further, suggesting it better
that “a hundred guilty persons should escape than one innocent person should
suffer.”210
C. The Fourth Amendment, Warrants, and the Use of Force against
Civilians
The deployment of federal troops in Portland also implicates rights
guaranteed to the people under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.
One of those rights is the protection against warrantless arrests.211 After
reports surfaced that federal officers were using “unmarked vehicles to drive
around Portland, detain protesters, and place them into the officers’ unmarked
208

Compare Lucas, supra note 199 (noting that the vast majority of citations issued by
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vehicles, removing them from public without either [formally] arresting them
or stating the basis for an arrest,” Oregon Attorney General Ellen Rosenblum
filed a complaint against the Department of Homeland Security and other
federal agencies, alleging unlawful detainment of demonstrators without
probable cause.212 Rosenblum sought a restraining order to prevent agents
employed by several Executive agencies from making any further warrantless
arrests.213
The federal courts have denounced warrantless arrests and other
unreasonable searches and seizures in countless cases.214 Significantly for the
situation in Portland, the Supreme Court has also held that the use of deadly
force can constitute a seizure, such that unreasonable use of deadly force by
law enforcement can violate the Fourth Amendment.215 In Tennessee v.
Garner,216 for example, the Court held that law enforcement’s use of deadly
force against an unarmed burglar violated the Fourth Amendment, regardless
of whether police had probable cause to believe that the individual was
engaged in criminal activity.217 The Court was “not convinced that the use of
deadly force is a sufficiently productive means of accomplishing [the police’s
goal of encouraging peaceful submission by suspects] to justify the killing of
nonviolent suspects.”218 Unfortunately, stories of Portland protesters like Nat
West and his 16-year-old daughter prove that neither innocence nor
nonviolence was a factor for the federal troops who arrived in American cities
following President Trump’s Executive Order.219 Both West and his daughter
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were peacefully protesting when federal troops engaged the crowd with tear
gas, “less-than-lethal munition,” and flash bangs.220 West’s daughter
“partially lost hearing after a device exploded next to [her] left ear;”
preliminary tests showed her hearing loss was “moderate to severe” and
effected ninety percent of her hearing in her left ear.221
Courts have been particularly hesitant about excessive use of force that
amounts to an unreasonable seizure by military personnel engaged in
domestic law-enforcement activities.222 In Bissonette v. Haig,223 the Eighth
Circuit considered a case brought by residents of Pine Ridge Indian
Reservation against federal officials and military personnel, in which the
plaintiffs sought damages for the military’s use of force to seize and confine
them within an “armed perimeter.”224 Plaintiffs contended that agents of the
federal government violated the Fourth Amendment by deploying federal
military forces without lawful authority.225 The court agreed that the plaintiffs
had stated a valid cause of action because federal military forces “directly
restrained [the] plaintiffs’ freedom of movement,” apparently exceeding any
statutory grant of authority by Congress.226
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Bissonette is an important acknowledgment of the “special threats to
constitutional government inherent in military enforcement of civilian
law.”227 The Eighth Circuit clearly laid out country’s “long tradition” of
limiting military involvement in civilian affairs “beginning with the
Declaration of Independence and continued in the Constitution.”228 Delegates
to the Constitutional Convention, for instance, had recognized that “when a
government wishes to deprive its citizens of freedom, and reduce them to
slavery, it generally makes use of a standing army.”229 The Eight Circuit
accordingly held that “if the use of military personnel is both unauthorized
by statute, and contrary to a specific criminal prohibition, and if citizens are
seized or searched by military means in such a case . . . such searches and
seizures are constitutionally ‘unreasonable.’”230 There are “limits established
by Congress on the use of the military for civilian law enforcement,” and
those limits cannot be flippantly disregarded consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.231 These observations are especially relevant in the context
Portland’s protests, where unbridled violence by federal agents was
pervasive.
Despite this recognition of the particular danger of military policing of
civilians, the federal courts have repeatedly upheld state-sponsored violence.
Recently, in Hernandez v. Mesa,232 the Supreme Court declined to recognize
a federal cause of action for Mexican parents whose child was fatally shot by
a United States Border Patrol Agent.233 The case involved two Mexican
children who were “playing a game, running across the [U.S.-Mexico
border], touching the fence on the U.S. side, and then running back across the
border” to Mexico.234 A Border Patrol Agent detained one of the kids and
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fired two shots at the second boy’s back as he ran away.235 One of the bullets
struck and killed him on the Mexican side of the border.236 The Court held
that no existing constitutional remedy applied to the case, and declined to
“fashion” one to address the situation.237 Even more disturbingly, the
majority wrote that it “presume[d] that Border Patrol policy and training
incorporate both the Executive’s understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition of unreasonable seizures and the Executive’s assessment of
circumstances at the border.”238 Because the Executive had thus decided the
Border Patrol Agent’s behavior was “reasonable conduct . . . under the
circumstances,” the Court not only abdicated its duty to determine when
actions by federal officials violate the Constitution, it affirmatively suggested
that “respect for the separation of powers” counseled against its weighing in
at all.239
These judicial decisions demonstrate that while courts have in theory
recognized that military policing of civilian matters is a grave threat to civil
liberties, some lives are valued over others. While the use of excessive force
and violence to control nonviolent citizens is unreasonable,240 and the use of
the military for civilian law enforcement poses special problems for
Americans’ civil liberties,241 a federal agent’s use of deadly force against an
unarmed Mexican child remains unassailable in the highest court of the
United States.242 That blatant inequality which plagues the justice system is
the foundation of movements like Black Lives Matter and the widespread
Portland protests of 2020, which seek to call attention to the ways in which
the government, including both courts and law enforcement, consistently and
apply constitutional protections unequally based on the biases of people in
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positions of power and privilege. The inequality should be self-evident. The
United States’ failure to recognize it is the reason that protesters use their
voices to fight for equality in the form of protests and demonstrations. As the
next section demonstrates, however, freedom of speech is no longer free for
those who wish to speak against the state.
D. Deterioration of the First Amendment
Ultimately, regardless of President Trump’s reasoning for sending troops
to Portland, their presence effectively quashed protesters’ First Amendment
rights to speak, peacefully organize, and demonstrate in the name of political
change. In addition to threats to individuals’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights, protestors and journalists in Portland were subject to federal
government actions that limited their exercising of protected free speech.
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment243 exists “principally to
protect discourse on public matters.”244 It reflects “a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials.”245 It is “[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power,” including
against governmental attempts to “disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints.”246
It is also “essential to our democratic form of government” and “furthers the
search for truth.”247 By protecting the “free discussion of governmental
affairs,” the First Amendment “ensure[s] that . . . individual citizen[s] can
effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of selfgovernment.”248
Despite these platitudes from the Supreme Court, federal agents acting
under the Executive’s control engaged in violent and suppressive tactics that
threatened Americans’ First Amendment rights throughout the protests of
243

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

244

Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011).

245

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).

246

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).

247

Janus v. Am. Fed’n State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2018).

248

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).

159

A NATION JOINS IN TEARS
2020. Many violent acts targeted journalists, including those who wore press
badges to distinguish themselves within crowds as observers committed to
reporting the news as it unfolded.249 Others were arrested, apparently without
probable cause.250 Some journalists sought judicial intervention, securing a
temporary restraining order from a federal court in Oregon that blocked
federal agents from using physical force or detaining clearly marked
journalists in Portland.251 The order was based in part on video documenting
federal officers shooting and macing reporters and legal observers.252
Protestors were also targeted. After resisting demonstrations of violence
that enflamed rather than calmed the demonstrations in Portland’s streets,253
many who were arrested were faced with a choice between continued
detainment or abandoning their First Amendment right to protest.254 After
several protestors were charged with committing relatively minor federal
offenses for “failure to obey a lawful order” or “disorderly conduct,” they
were released only when a federal Magistrate Judge added, as a condition of
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release, terms under which protestors forfeited their constitutional rights.255
The conditional release orders have included indefinite permeations of First
Amendment limitations. One release order mandated that the defendant “not
attend any other protests, rallies, assemblies or public gathering in the state
of Oregon.”256 Another release order contained a similar term, handwritten
by United States Magistrate Judge V. Acosta on a pre-typed document, which
prohibited a protestor from attending protests, assemblies, demonstrations, or
public gatherings in the state of Oregon.257 Ramya Krishnan, an attorney at
Columbia University’s Knight First Amendment Institute, had no difficulty
concluded that the conditions were likely unconstitutional infringements of
the protestors’ constitutional right to free assembly, because the “blanket ban
on attending future protests” seriously infringed the individuals’ rights
without being “reasonably related to any legitimate goal of pretrial
release.”258 This is a sad state for Americans’ most cherished civil rights, as
the Supreme Court has historically given great deference to the protections
of the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
President Trump’s decision to unilaterally deploy federal troops to police
the political protests in Portland raises several constitutional issues of
monumental import. His use of Executive power demonstrated an unchecked,
expansive view of Article II that threatens principles of both federalism and
the separation of powers. Additionally, by openly considering invoking the
Insurrection Act, President Trump once again drew attention to a too
powerful tool in the Executive’s toolkit—one that has been expanded over
the course of American History and increasingly seems to have no
meaningful limits. While amendments to the Insurrection Act were brought
to the floor of the House of Representatives, Congress failed to meet the
urgency of the moment, and has left the President’s powers almost
255
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completely unchecked. That leaves only the courts to protect Americans’
civil rights and liberties. Yet the courts, too, have a checkered record of
reining in the Executive, particularly when the individuals affected are
minorities—including people like George Floyd whose untimely death
spurred the protests of Summer 2020, as well as President Trump’s
belligerent response. The Executive’s power to deploy the militia, armed
forces, and other federal agents to act as police in American neighborhoods
cannot remain an unlimited power. If such unilateral actions remain
unchecked, the civil rights guaranteed to Americans by the U.S. Constitution
lie in jeopardy.
Political ambivalence, evidenced by less than half of the eligible voting
population casting a vote in the 2016 general election, is also part of the
problem. Despite the change in leadership caused by the 2020 election of Joe
Biden to the Presidency, issues plaguing the nation cannot be solved merely
by voting into power a different political party. Instead, “We the People”
must decide if giving the federal government unfettered power to deploy
military troops on American soil to put down protests is consistent with our
American identity and values. Recall that at the conclusion of the
Constitutional Convention in 1787, a group of citizens asked Benjamin
Franklin what type of government the Founders had proposed; his response
was “a republic, if you can keep it.”259 Franklin’s statement made clear that it
is the people’s duty—our duty—to uphold our system of government, not just
our representatives’. Chief Justice Roberts echoed this sentiment not long
before the first impeachment of President Trump, writing that “each
generation . . . has an obligation to pass on to the next, not only a fully
functioning government responsive to the needs of the people, but the tools
to understand and improve it.”260
President Trump’s use of military force to respond to the protests in
Portland made clear that all of our unalienable rights can still be encroached
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upon. Our ambivalence could mean the extinction of our democracy. To
prevent the Constitution becoming an evanescent memory we must actively
preserve the values we hold dear and heal the lacerations of division across
this nation in tears.
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